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Fighting Words: Targeting Speech in Armed Conflict
A. Louis Evans†
Abstract: Freedom of speech is considered one of the most fundamental
human rights, but it is not without limits. In the context of an armed conflict,
engaging in certain types of speech can form the basis for lethal targeting by
States. Consensus exists in customary international law that speech-driven
strikes constitute a lawful use of force under jus in bello standards. For example,
a civilian who communicates the position of targets, or broadcasts tactical
intelligence for a specific military operation has, by their speech, made
themselves a lawful target. While customary international law agrees that
speech-driven targeting is lawful, there has been little discussion by States or
scholars of the requirements that form the basis for speech-driven targeting. The
lack of scholarship concerning speech-driven targeting by States undercuts the
legitimacy of speech-driven targeting and suggests that international law is not
currently imposing adequate limits on the use of force by States against the
fundamental human right of free speech. To justify speech-driven strikes, States
and commentators use traditional tests based on a person’s actions to determine
whether an individual has forfeited their protected status and is targetable.
These action-based tests are problematic and lead to inconsistent results
because they are designed to assess an individual’s actions as opposed to
speech. To address this problem, this article will provide the first descriptive
and normative analysis of speech-driven targeting. Descriptively, the article
explains how speech-driven targeting currently exists in international law while
simultaneously demonstrating the lack of guidance and agreement about what
is required before the lawful use of lethal force. Next, from a normative
perspective, the article proposes a core set of factors that should inform the
speech-driven targeting analysis. The article then applies these factors to a realworld example of America’s use of force in Yemen against Anwar al-Awlaki
to explore how using the factors would affect the legality of such a strike. The
article concludes that using these proposed factors would enhance protections
for freedom of speech while simultaneously enhancing State decisions and
actions from a substantive and procedural perspective.
Cite as: A. Louis Evans, Fighting Words: Targeting Speech in Armed
Conflict, 30 WASH. INT’L L.J. 598 (2021).

INTRODUCTION
On September 30, 2011, President Barack Obama
announced that Anwar al-Awlaki was killed by a targeted
American drone strike in Yemen and that his death marked a
“major blow to al-Qaida’s most active operational affiliate.”1
While Awlaki was a self-professed extremist and vocal leader in
†
Judge Advocate, Major, U.S. Marine Corps. The views herein should not be
attributed to any of the author’s institutional affiliates, including the U.S. Department of
Defense. The author thanks his family Ali, Lou-Lou and Caroline Evans.
1
President Barack Obama, Remarks at the Change of Command Ceremony for
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at Fort Meyer, Virginia (Sept. 30, 2011).
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the al-Qaida terrorist network, he never personally conducted a
violent attack or used armed force against the United States.
Instead, Awlaki attacked the United States with speech by “calling
on individuals in the U.S. and around the globe to kill innocent
women and children to advance [his] murderous agenda.”2 Based
on Awlaki’s violent speech as opposed to actions, the Department
of Justice (DoJ) under the Obama administration determined that
Awlaki posed an imminent threat of violent attack against the
United States. And, based on this determined imminent threat, the
DoJ determined that targeting Awlaki based on his speech was not
unlawful.3
Unfortunately, international law currently provides little
guidance on what factors are relevant when making what this
article calls “speech-driven” targeting decisions. However, the
stakes are high: freedom of speech is considered one of the most
fundamental human rights, and using lethal force is the most
extreme response. When States have the unchecked ability to
decide that any dissident speech beyond their borders can be met
with lethal force, the consequences are dire for the marketplace of
ideas made possible by freedom of speech.
The lethal strike on Awlaki is only the most recent
manifestation of speech-driven targeting. A long history of state
practice indicates that speech-driven targeting is lawful under
certain circumstances. Prominent examples of speech-driven
targets include propagandists such as Wa'il Adil Hasan Salman alFayad in 20164, recruiters like Awlaki in 2011, and planners and
coordinators like Osama-bin Laden in 20115 and Qasem
Soleimani in 2020.6 Despite the prevalence of speech-driven
targeting, there has been very little discussion, by either States or
2

Id.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, WHITE PAPER ON LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL
OPERATION DIRECTED AGAINST A U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL LEADER
OF AL-QA’IDA OR AN ASSOCIATED FORCE (2011) [HEREINAFTER DOJ WHITE PAPER ON
LAWFULNESS OF LETHAL OPERATION AGAINST U.S. CITIZEN].
4
US Says It Killed IS Information Minister al-Fayad, BBC (Sept. 16, 2016),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37390408.
5
Helene Cooper, Bin Laden Dead, U.S. Official Says, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2011),
https://web.archive.org/web/20110502033900/http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/
01/bin-laden-dead-u-s-official-says/.
6
Michael Crowley et al., U.S. Strike in Iraq Kills Qassim Suleimani, Commander
of Iranian Forces, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/02/worl
d/middleeast/qassem-soleimani-iraq-iran-attack.html.
3
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scholars, as to what factors determine whether an individual is a
lawful target based on their speech.
Traditional targeting decisions are made based on an
individual’s actions, and for the purpose of this article, this kind
of targeting will be referred to as “action-driven” targeting. The
factors for traditional targeting, however, were developed only
with a person’s actions in mind and not their speech. Therefore,
the factors have historically been inconsistently and
inappropriately applied in speech-driven targeting situations. This
article contains both descriptive and normative descriptions of
speech-driven targeting. In the descriptive portion, Part I of this
article illustrates current state practice surrounding speech-driven
strikes and demonstrates how States currently make speech-driven
targeting decisions. Part II then examines speech-driven targeting
in a historical context and provides an original analysis of speechdriven targeting.
After establishing that the current speech-driven targeting
test lacks sufficient content to act as a rule for States, Part III looks
to two primary sources to establish a core set of factors for a better
speech-driven targeting test. First, Part III looks to the history set
out in Part II to establish a core set of factors for speech-driven
targeting. Next, in order to understand what speech is protected
and what speech falls outside of protected limits, Part III turns to
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Identifying what speech the United States values and protects,
from a constitutional perspective, serves as instructive guidance
as to what speech the United States should also value and protect
in the international context.
After creating factors for a speech-driven targeting test
based on historical practice and domestic freedom of speech
protections, Part IV applies this test to the real-world case of
Anwar al-Awlaki. By applying the newly proposed factors to the
United States’ lethal strike against Awlaki, Part IV will therefore
provide greater texture to the proposed speech-driven targeting
test. Furthermore, Part IV will demonstrate how international law
can affect foreign policy decisions: as a constraint on action, as a
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basis for justifying or legitimizing action, and by providing
organizational structures and procedures.7
As States monitor more speech and project lethal force
further from the battlefield via technology, a speech-driven
targeting test is crucial for creating international norms that
properly balance the freedom of speech against the right of States
to use force in self-defense. A properly developed speech-driven
targeting test should serve as an essential check on States’ use of
force against speech, but to do so requires a test with greater
substantive content than exists at present. This article provides
that content.
I.

JUS IN BELLO AND SPEECH-DRIVEN TARGETING

The primary goal of a State in any armed conflict is the
destruction or neutralization of the enemy’s ability to wage war.
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) tempers the way in which
States achieve this goal by requiring that States avoid unnecessary
death, destruction, and suffering to the extent possible while
waging war.8 To achieve this end, IHL sets forth four principles
that, as applicable, must be addressed prior to the use of force in a
jus in bello context.9 These four principles are: (1) military
necessity, (2) humanity, (3) proportionality, and (4) distinction.
These four principles apply to both individuals and objects.
However, due to this article’s emphasis on speech-driven

7
ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND
THE ROLE OF LAW 7 (Oxford Univ. Press 1974); see generally Ashley S. Deeks, “Unwilling
or Unable”: Toward a Normative Framework for Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 55 VA. J.
INT’L L. 483 (2012) (discussing a structure for a descriptive and normative discussion for

interpretations of international law).
8
OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL ¶ 2.3.1
(2016) [hereinafter LAW OF WAR MANUAL]. The International Humanitarian Law is also
referred to as the Law of Armed Conflict or the Law of War. For consistency, this Article
will refer to this body of law as International Humanitarian Law (IHL).
9
The applicability of the Law of Armed Conflict is limited to conflicts of
sufficient scope and intensity to be classified as conflicts as opposed to law enforcement
actions. If a conflict does not possess the appropriate level of scope or intensity it is covered
by international human rights law (IHRL), which is akin to a law enforcement legal
construct. For example, violent protestors planning to bomb a police station would be
treated under an IHRL framework. This Article will deal exclusively with (IHL). INT’L
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, What Is the Difference Between IHL and Human Rights Law?
(Jan. 22, 2015), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/what-difference-between-ihl-andhuman-rights-law.
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targeting, the application of force against individuals will be the
primary focus.
When considering the use of force against an individual
in an armed conflict, the foremost principle is that of military
necessity. This principle permits any action that creates a distinct
military advantage that helps defeat the enemy as quickly and
efficiently as possible and is not otherwise prohibited under the
law of war. 10 The first question in deciding whether speech-driven
targeting is lawful is to determine whether targeting speech can
result in a distinct military advantage. The next principle to
consider is humanity, which forbids injury, destruction, or
suffering that is unnecessary to accomplish a legitimate military
purpose.11 The third principle, proportionality, requires that the
anticipated military advantage gained outweigh any death to
civilians or destruction of civilian objects.12 Finally, the principle
of distinction requires parties to distinguish between combatants
and the civilian population.13
These four factors taken together form a conjunctive test,
whereby the expected violation of any one principle renders the
proposed targeting unlawful. Therefore, any decision to target an
individual requires consideration of all the applicable principles
before the legality of the targeting may be determined. Although
the fundamental principles of IHL outlined above are widely
agreed upon, their application and interpretation varies between
States.14 In an attempt to minimize variance, the Geneva
Conventions recognized the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) as an impartial, neutral, and independent
organization to promote, strengthen, and offer guidance on
interpretation of IHL.15 For this reason, when comparing and
10
LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 8, ¶ 2.2; see also NELS MELZER, INT’L
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT
PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009).
11
LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 8, ¶ 2.3.
12
Id. ¶ 2.4.
13
Id. ¶ 2.5.
14
See generally INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, Casebook, Glossary,
Fundamental Principles of IHL, https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/fundamentalprinciples-ihl (last visited Apr. 6, 2021).
15
INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, Status Update: The ICRC’s Legal Standing
Explained (Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/status-update-icrcs-legalstanding-explained.
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examining any States’ interpretation of IHL, it is important to use
the ICRC’s interpretation for comparison.
Under both the United States’ and the ICRC’s principles,
the principles of distinction and military necessity carry the most
significant weight. However, all the principles must still be
considered to assess the legality of speech-driven targeting. By
examining state practice and commentary, Part I demonstrates that
speech-driven targeting can be conducted in a manner consistent
with these four principles and therefore in compliance with IHL.
A. Military Necessity and Speech-Driven Targeting
The first principle to consider in speech-driven targeting
is military necessity. As outlined above, the critical element of
military necessity is determining whether targeting an individual’s
speech can result in a distinct military advantage or help to defeat
the enemy. In making this decision, the United States’ and the
ICRC’s guidance differ slightly. The United States’ guidance
states that military necessity allows “all measures needed to defeat
the enemy as quickly and efficiently as possible.”16 This position
is in contrast to the ICRC guidance, which states that military
necessity only permits actions that “weaken the military capacity”
of the enemy.17 This difference in the two definitions centers on
the scope what is targetable. The ICRC guidance is limited to
targets tied to military capacity, while the United States’
definition is broader and centers on any targets that help defeat the
enemy. This difference in definition, while slight, results in three
notable disagreements in speech-driven targeting. The three
primary differences between the United States’ and the ICRC’s
interpretations are manifested in three classes of individuals: (1)
planners and leaders of armed groups, (2) propagandists, and (3)
recruiters and trainers. Discussion of targeting these three
categories of individuals based on speech, spans across military
necessity, proportionality, and distinction, and will be examined
in greater detail in Part II of this article.
Despite these differences, it is important to note that both
the United States and the ICRC agree that speech alone can form
16

LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 8, ¶ 2.2.
INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, Casebook, Glossary, Military Necessity,
https://casebook.ICRC.org/glossary/military-necessity (last visited Feb. 15, 2020).
17
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the basis for targeting under military necessity analysis. For
example, both the United States and the ICRC would agree that an
unarmed civilian who is verbally directing troops into firing
positions on the frontline is targetable. This individual’s speech is
directly enhancing the military capacity of the enemy and
targeting her weakens the enemy’s military capacity, thereby
making her a lawful target under the principle of military
necessity. On the other end of the spectrum, is speech that supports
military capacity. However, speech that supports military capacity
does so in such an anemic manner that both the ICRC and the
United States would agree this speech is not targetable. For
example, a civilian who voices support for the military in general
terms by wearing a yellow ribbon may help the military’s morale,
but in such an anemic manner that the civilian would retain her
protections no matter how vocal and fervent her verbal support is
for the military.18
Based on the preceding discussion, it is clear that on either
end of the debate, some forms of speech meet the criteria for
targeting under military necessity, while others unmistakably fall
short. What is more concerning, however, is the vast area of
speech between these two extremes that have insufficient state
practice or law surrounding the speech to give clear indications of
the speech’s status. This lack of clarity can be fatal for individuals
that misjudge an enemy’s interpretation of international law in an
armed conflict. As seen in analysis below, similar concerns arise
when analyzing the principle of distinction.
B. Humanity and Speech-Driven Targeting
The principle of humanity forbids “the infliction of
suffering, injury or destruction unnecessary to accomplish a
legitimate military purpose.”19 Since it has been established that
speech-driven targeting can serve a legitimate military purpose,
there is little left to consider under the principle of humanity, as
this principle only prohibits injury or destruction that does not
have a legitimate military purpose. The fact that speech-driven
18
Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“[M]ere sympathy
for or association with an enemy organization does not render an individual a member of
that enemy organization's armed forces. Instead, the individual must have some sort of
‘structured’ role in the ‘hierarchy’ of the enemy force.”).
19
LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 8, ¶ 2.3.
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targeting serves a legitimate military purpose, however, does not
allow the targeting of speech by any means available. There must
still be consideration of the anticipated military advantage gained
versus the damage to civilian objects or people, which invokes the
principle of proportionality.
C. Proportionality and Speech-Driven Targeting
Proportionality requires that when making targeting
decisions, any anticipated collateral damage or death to civilian
objects or people cannot exceed the expected or anticipatory
military advantage gained.20 It might be an intuitive reaction of
liberal societies to argue that lethal force is never an appropriate
response to speech, or that any collateral damage in a speechdriven strike is excessive. This position, however, is not supported
by States or commentators either in state practice or rhetoric (e.g.,
no State has ever claimed that speech-driven targeting is per se
unlawful). It must be accepted, as outlined by numerous examples
cited in this paper, that speech-driven targeting is practiced by all
States in some form. Therefore, when conducting speech-driven
strikes, so long as the military advantage gained by targeting the
speech21 is not outweighed by the collateral damage to civilians
and civilian objects, the proportionality requirement will be met.
D. Distinction and Speech-Driven Targeting
Distinction is often the most challenging of the four
principles to apply in traditional action-driven targeting decisions,
and the same holds in the examination of speech-driven targeting.
Cited by the International Court of Criminal Justice as a “cardinal”
rule in armed conflicts, distinction prohibits direct targeting of

20
Note that the definition for proportionality under jus in bello differs from the
definition for proportionality under jus ad bellum. Under jus ad bellum, a state’s decision
to use force cannot exceed the force used in the attack suffered. Robert Sloane, The Cost
of Conflation: Preserving the Dualism of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in the
Contemporary Law of War, 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 47, 52–53 (2009). Ample opportunity
exists for further scholarly research and debate as to what forms and kinds of speech are
sufficient to warrant the use of force in the jus ad bellum context, but they are beyond the
scope of this Article.
21
Throughout this article the term speech or speaker are used interchangeably
when discussing targeting, just as act and actor are used interchangeably when discussing
action-driven targeting.

606

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 30 NO. 3

civilians in an armed conflict.22 Determining what speech causes
a civilian to lose their protections and become a lawful target
requires careful examination.
In an armed conflict, whether international or noninternational, individuals become distinguishable as targets based
on two primary theories.23 First, individuals may be targeted based
on their status as members of the military or of an organized armed
group.24 For example, if State A is in an armed conflict with State
B, all of State B’s soldiers, with minor exceptions, are lawful
targets for State A’s military.25 Under this paradigm, it is not a
person’s specific actions that make them targetable, but their
status as a member of a government military force or organized
armed group. Targeting decisions based on an individual’s status
are referred to in international law as “status-based” targeting.26
The second category is “conduct-based” targeting, which
allows the targeting of any individual, regardless of their military
affiliation, if that individual is engaged in conduct hostile to
friendly forces.27 In IHL, this analysis of whether an individual
has engaged in hostilities and becomes targetable is referred to as
direct participation in hostilities (DPH).28 For instance, under a
22
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226, 257 (July 8).
23
An International Armed Conflict (IAC) is covered by Geneva Conventions
Common Article 2 and is when the belligerents are both States, e.g. State A is fighting
State B. A Non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC) is covered by Geneva Conventions
Common Article 3, and is when a State is fighting a Non-State Armed Group. See Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field (First Geneva Convention) art. 2–3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.
24
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art.
43(1)–(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I].
25
Exceptions include non-combatants such as doctors, chaplains and those that
are hors de combat.
26
U.S. ARMY, JUDGE ADVOCATE, GENERAL’S LEGAL CTR. AND SCH., INT’L AND
OPERATIONAL LAW DEP’T, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT DESKBOOK 137 (5th ed., 2015)
[hereinafter ARMED CONFLICT DESKBOOK].
27
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 13(3),
Dec. 7, 1978, 1125 U.N.T.S. 610 [hereinafter Protocol II].
28
DPH indicates when a civilian has forfeited their protections from being made
the object of an attack. While what specific actions constitute DPH differs by State, the
concept of DPH and the loss of protections remains the same. See generally LAW OF WAR
MANUAL, supra note 8, ¶ 5.8; NELS MELZER, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS,
INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009).
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traditional action-driven targeting test, a civilian who picks up a
rifle and starts shooting at enemy troops is targetable, regardless
of any previous protected status. Individuals are targetable for the
duration of their direct participation.29 International law refers to
those who become targetable based on their conduct as “conductbased” targets because their personal conduct has made them
targetable.30
Status-based and conduct-based targeting designations
are well accepted in international law, but were designed with an
individual’s actions in mind rather than their speech. Despite this,
the categories remain valid when examining targeting based on an
individual’s speech, and these established definitions will be used
for the purposes of examining speech-driven targeting.
1. Conduct-based targeting in the speech-driven
context. — Conduct-based targeting centers upon the actions of an
individual. Once an individual’s conduct crosses a threshold of
participation in hostilities, they are said to have directly
participated in hostilities and are targetable. The conduct that
provides the required direct participation for targeting often falls
into one of two categories: (1) if an individual conducts an
“attack,” or (2) if their actions are going to cause an “imminent
attack.” While this paradigm was designed with an individual’s
actions in mind, the categories of attack and imminent attack again
remain valid when examining targeting based on an individual’s
speech. Accordingly, these categories will be used in the
examination of speech-driven conduct-based targeting.
1.a. Speech constituting an attack. — While the
definitions of “attack” and “imminent attack” vary among States,
the concepts are consistent. An attack is generally defined as the
actual use of force or violence in the immediate present, against a
party to the conflict.31 Imminent attacks are those that have not yet
occurred but will transpire in the determinate future.32 As it is the
29
It is important to note that there is significant debate surrounding the question
of duration of participation. There are a wide range of positions from States and
commentators on how long an individual is targetable for after D.P.H.’ing. While this
debate is outside the scope of the speech-driven targeting debate, it is important to note.
30
ARMED CONFLICT DESKBOOK, supra note 26, 137.
31
MELZER, supra note 10, at 45; U.S. ARMY, JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S
LEGAL CTR. AND SCH., INT’L AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEP’T, OPERATIONAL LAW
HANDBOOK 473 (2015) [hereinafter OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK].
32
MELZER, supra note 10, at 45; OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, 473.
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more concrete and immediate concept, how attacks manifest
themselves in speech-driven context will be addressed first.
One illustration of an action-driven “attack” is a civilian
who fires a rifle at troops. By their conduct, this civilian has
committed an attack and is a lawful target. While an attack is easy
to define in the action-driven context, it is more challenging to
define for speech-driven targeting. Indeed, based on the
immediacy requirement of an attack under conduct-based
targeting, it is difficult to argue that speech alone can ever
constitute an actual attack. While speech and words can inspire
others to act, speech itself can never be considered an act of force
or violence. Further, no state manual or interpretative guidance
reviewed for this article indicated that speech could rise to the
level of harm to be considered an attack.33 Thus, under speechdriven targeting, it does not seem that an individual could conduct
a verbal attack.
For example, the actions against the United States on
September 11, 2001, were an attack within the definition outlined
above. Despite this, it would be difficult to argue that the architect
of the attack, Osama bin Laden, committed a conduct-based
attack.34 While bin Laden planned and directed the attack via
speech, he did not carry out the actual attack.35 Because speech
itself cannot be considered an attack, under conduct-based
targeting, the only remaining possibility for lawful speech-driven
targeting rests on the premise that speech can constitute an
“imminent attack.”

33
See generally LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 8; THE JOINT DOCTRINE &
CONCEPTS CENTRE, U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW
OF ARMED CONFLICT (2004); DEFENCE PUBL’G SERV., COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE, MANUAL ON THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (2006); CANADA
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT MANUAL AT THE
OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVELS (2001).
34
This is not to say that targeting bin Laden was unlawful under international law.
This example merely helps to illustrate and understand how to frame speech-based
targeting decisions.
35
Of course, some would argue that in the bin-Laden example, the “attack”
distinction is moot because as a member of al-Qaeda, bin Laden could be targeted under a
status-based targeting analysis. However, this counter-argument fails because the analysis
of speech-driven status-based targeting will show that, without additional action, speech
alone is insufficient to confer status as a member of a military or organized armed group
for the purposes of “status-based” targeting.
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1.b. Speech constituting an imminent attack. — In
contrast to an attack, an “imminent attack” is one that has not yet
occurred, yet its manifestation is instant and overwhelming.36 An
example of an action-driven imminent attack is a civilian who
picks up a loaded rifle and aims it at troops.37 Although the civilian
has yet to attack or cause harm, their actions and intent to commit
an attack are obvious, and the civilian is therefore targetable. This
section concludes that speech can form the basis of an imminent
attack, thereby justifying the targeting of individuals based on
speech.
Three well-accepted examples illustrate how speech can
constitute an imminent attack. The first example of an imminent
attack through speech is a civilian who provides tactical
directions, such as acting as a spotter for indirect fire.38 The
second example returns to the bin-Laden example above.
Although bin-Laden’s actions did not constitute an attack on the
United States on September 11, 2001, his speech planning the
attack and directing others to conduct the attack did constitute an
imminent attack. The third example is a civilian acting as a
lookout, alerting enemy forces to troop movements.39 These
examples are all widely accepted as situations where speech
constitutes an imminent attack.40
Despite agreement that speech can constitute an imminent
attack, disagreement remains among States as to precisely what
kinds of speech are sufficiently imminent to justify the use of
force. Examining the positions on each end of the imminence
debate helps to frame the discussion in Part II. As noted
throughout this article, the ICRC has a generally restrictive view
on when civilians lose their protections and become targetable.
The ICRC maintains a particularly conservative view of how
36

OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 31, at 473.
What qualifies as an “imminent attack” or “hostile intent” is difficult to define
in the abstract. Recognizing this, the San Remo Manual, a non-binding codification
of customary international law, gives the following non-exhaustive list: a. Aiming or
directing weapons, b. Adopting an attack profile, c. Closing within weapon release range,
d. Illuminating with radar or laser designators, e. Passing targeting information, f. Laying
or preparing to lay naval mines. SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA, 22 (Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995). See also
LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 8, ¶ 5.8.3.1.
38
LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 8, ¶ 5.8.3.1.
39
Id.
40
Id.
37
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closely an individual’s actions must be associated with the
battlefield before they constitute DPH and provide the legal
grounds for targeting.41 Despite this restrictive view, ICRC
interpretive guidance supports the position that speech can
constitute an imminent attack. The ICRC does not say this
directly, but includes “transmitting tactical targeting information
for an attack,” as well as verbal planning and direction of specific
attacks as examples of imminent attacks.42
Requiring targetable speech to be in close proximity to the
battlefield aligns with ICRC’s position on action-driven targeting
requirements. In particular, the ICRC requires that actions directly
cause harm and be only one causal step away from an attack to be
considered imminent.43 For example, under ICRC interpretations,
generally recruiting people to fight in a conflict is too broad, but
recruiting people to conduct a specific attack is only one causal
step away from an attack and therefore targetable behavior.44 The
one casual step requirement is the subject of tremendous debate
and criticism by States and commentators. Specifically, the United
States believes that the one casual step requirement is an overly
restrictive means of determining when an individual has
demonstrated hostile intent.45
If the ICRC and States that follow the ICRC guidance
represent the more conservative end of the spectrum in assessing
imminence, there must be an examination of the other end of the
spectrum. In defining the limits of what would not be considered
targetable speech, the ICRC specifically mentions enemy
“recruiters, trainers, and propagandists” as too many causal steps
removed from an imminent attack to be lawful targets.46 State
practice demonstrates that a number of States disagree with this
assertion.47
41
Ryan Kresbach, Totality of the Circumstances: The DoD Law of War Manual
and the Evolving Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, 9 J. NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'Y
125, 156 (2017).
42
MELZER, supra note 10, at 48.
43
Id. at 53.
44
Id.
45
Stephen Pomper, Toward a Limited Consensus on the Loss of Civilian Immunity
in Non-International Armed Conflict: Making Progress through Practice, in 88
INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES, NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 186 (Kenneth Watkin & Andrew J. Norris eds., 2012).
46
MELZER, supra note 10, at 34.
47
Pomper, supra note 45 at 187–90.
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Using the three categories of recruiters, trainers, and
propagandists is useful for two reasons. First, each of these
categories uses speech to conduct imminent attacks, whether by
verbally recruiting others to conduct attacks, verbally training
others to conduct attacks, or verbally encouraging the population
at large to conduct attacks via propaganda. Second, this list is
helpful because, on numerous occasions, the United States and
other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies have
targeted and killed recruiters, trainers, and propagandists, creating
clear categories of disagreement among States and the ICRC for
what constitutes an imminent attack in speech-driven targeting
analysis.48
The United States’ position is that even though
individuals from these categories might not be engaged in a
specific imminent attack, their speech is sufficient to justify
targeting because they are seeking to “inspire, enable, and direct
attacks.”49 What constitutes “imminence” is the gray area that
consumes this part of IHL and will be examined further in Part II
and used to produce a proposed rule for speech-driven targeting in
Part III. Despite disagreement as to the precise definition of
imminence, it is important to note that there is a general consensus
that speech can form the legal basis for conduct-based targeting,
so long as the speech represents an imminent attack.
2. Status-based targeting in the speech-driven
context. — State practice indicates that speech alone cannot
support status-based targeting. This conclusion is based on an
examination of status-based targeting in both the formal military
48
Prominent examples in the war on terror include Anwar al-Awlaki, Ahmad
Abousamara (aka Abu Sulayman ash-Shami and Abu Maysarah ash-Shami), and Abu
Muhammad al-Furqan (aka Dr, Wa’ik Adel Hasan Salman al-Fayad). See, e.g., Mark
Mazzetti et al., How a U.S. Citizen Came to Be in America’s Cross Hairs, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 9, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/10/world/middleeast/anwar-al-awlakia-us-citizen-in-americas-cross-hairs.html; see also Paul Cruickshank, ISIS Lifts Veil on
American at Heart of its Propaganda Machine, CNN (Apr. 7, 2017), https://edition.cnn.c
om/2017/04/06/middleeast/isis-american-propaganda-editor/; see also IS Confirms Death
of Propaganda Chief Abu Mohammed al-Furqan, BBC (Oct. 11, 2016),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37619225.
49
Owen Bowcott, Is the Targeting of ISIS Member Sally Jones Legally Justified?
UK Attorney General Set Out Legal Advice That Allows Such Actions But Strike Raises
Question of Whether UK is Operating Kill-List, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 12, 2017, 10:39 AM)
(quoting Jeremy Wright, Queens Counsel), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct
/12/is-targeting-of-isis-member-sally-jones-legally-justified.
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context and the more informal context of organized armed
groups.50 In traditional militaries, civilians are regularly
transformed into combatants by swearing an oath of enlistment,
going to basic training, and taking up arms. In non-traditional
military settings of organized armed groups, like the Islamic State
of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), civilians achieve a similar
transformation by swearing an oath of loyalty to a group and
taking up arms against the enemy. In each case, it is necessary to
determine when an individual transforms from a civilian to a
combatant, thus becoming a lawful target. The “when” is of
crucial import because it determines whether swearing an oath
(i.e., speech alone), is sufficient for a civilian to lose protections
from attack or whether there must be further action, such as
training or taking up arms.
2.a. Speech conferring status in the military. — As IHL
has expanded protections to civilians and made the distinction
between civilians and the military more important, the question of
when an individual is targetable, based on status, has become a
matter of crucial import. 51 The most formal targetable position an
individual can assume is as a member of a state’s military. Despite
the importance of this status, United States’ guidance on what
precisely transforms a civilian into a formal member of the
military is lacking. This want of guidance means that it is unclear
whether an oath of enlistment, i.e.., speech alone, is sufficient to
provide a legal basis for targeting. Thus, to determine the United
States’ position on speech-driven targeting, there must be an
examination of United States’ state practice.
While current United States’ guidance is silent, historical
guidance and state practice is not. The 1863 Lieber Code, a
general order signed by President Lincoln, dictated how soldiers
should comport themselves in wartime and is informative as one

50

LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 8, ¶ 4.3.
Article 22 states: “[A]s civilization has advanced during the last centuries, so
has likewise steadily advanced, especially in war on land, the distinction between the
private individual belonging to a hostile country and the hostile country itself, with its men
in arms.” INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE U.S. IN THE FIELD,
GENERAL ORDERS NO. 100, art. 22 (War Dept., Washington D.C., 1863) (emphasis added)
[hereinafter Lieber Code].
51
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of the first codifications of IHL.52 In determining who is a lawful
combatant, the Lieber Code states that “so soon as a man is armed
by a sovereign government and takes the soldier’s oath of fidelity,
he is a belligerent; his killing, wounding, or other warlike acts are
not individual crimes or offenses.”53 The conjunctive “and”
included in the Lieber Code means that, in addition to an “oath of
fidelity,” (i.e., speech), a civilian must also take some action, such
as taking up arms, before they become targetable based on their
status. This early codification of state practice makes clear that
speech alone is insufficient to transform a civilian into a
combatant. Unfortunately, the clarity provided by the Lieber Code
no longer exists in current United States doctrine.
Due to the lack of explicit guidance, state practice
provides the only source on whether speech alone can cause a
civilian to lose their protections from attack. Practice by the
United States and other States indicates that speech alone cannot
support status-based targeting. The state practice in question
centers on non-combatants. Although all military members take
the same oath of enlistment, not all military members are
targetable. Certain military members, such as chaplains, are nontargetable and are labeled as non-combatants and do not carry
wepons.54 Despite taking the same oath and engaging in the same
speech to join the military as combatants, it appears to be the
action of not taking up arms that preserves non-combatants’
protected status. Thus, current state practice seems to support the
action-driven requirements outlined by the Lieber Code.
In keeping with the explicit requirements outlined by the
Lieber Code, because non-combatants have not followed their
oath with action, they are not targetable. Since these noncombatants have joined the armed forces through the same speech
as other military members, but retain a non-targetable status, an
inference can be made that speech alone is insufficient to
transform a civilian into a combatant based on their status as a
member of a military. Because States regularly recognize and
52
See generally Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States
in the Field (Lieber Code) (24 Apr. 1863), INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/110.
53
Lieber Code, supra note 51, at art. 57.
54
Non-combatants, like civilians, can of course lose their protections if they DPH.
LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 8, ¶ 5.8.
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practice this distinction and do so out of a sense of legal
obligation, there exists a presumption under customary
international law that military oaths alone are insufficient to
support status-based targeting.55
2.b. Speech conferring status in organized armed
groups. — The informal membership in organized armed groups
stands in contrast to the formal membership in state militaries.
This informal association makes assessing what precise event
denotes membership even more difficult. However, the question
is of significant import, as most modern conflicts involve
organized armed groups. Determining membership in organized
armed groups based on speech is further complicated by two
additional factors. First, the concept of organized armed groups in
armed conflicts is a relatively new concept when compared to
formal military membership.56 Second, States rarely provide
candid, unclassified explanations as to the rationale behind
targeting decisions.57 Despite the difficulties presented by these
two factors, state practice, coupled with advisory opinions,
indicates that speech alone cannot establish membership in an
organized armed group.
Because the United States rarely declassifies the basis for
individual targeting decisions, it is essential to understand the
overarching intent behind United States’ practice. Through both
action and verbiage, the United States expresses a strong bias and
intent to assess the liability of combatants—privileged and
unprivileged—similarly.58 Because of the intent for similar
treatment, and because Section 1.4.2.1 of this article established
55
Customary international law is typically defined as law that results from a
general and consistent practice by States, which the States follow out of a sense of legal
obligation, or acceptance of the norm. See J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary
International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449, 452 (2000). Therefore, understanding past state
practice in related circumstances is instructive as to the state of customary international
law in a particular area.
56
Gloria Gaggioli, Targeting Individuals Belonging to an Armed Group, 51
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 901, 904 (2018).
57
Id. at 914.
58
This distinction is between persons who have met the qualifications to receive
the privileges of combatant status and those who have not; the terms “lawful combatant”
and “unlawful combatant” are also used. The United States has made its position clear
regarding similar considerations for combatant liability purposes in two aspects. First, in
the temporal aspect of for how long an individual is targetable, and second, in the functional
aspect of targeting concerning what actions constitute a continuous combat function to
justify targeting. LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 8, ¶ 4.3.2.2, 5.8.4.2.
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that the United States does not consider speech sufficient to
establish combatant status in the military context, there should be
a bias for arriving at the same conclusion in the context of
membership in organized armed groups.59
In addition to the Lieber Code, one of the oldest
codifications of IHL, and thus the best evidence of historical state
practice, are the Hague Conventions. While the Lieber Code only
applied to United States soldiers, the Hague Conventions, first
signed in 1899, were international in nature and signed by 51
States, including the United States.60 Because the United States is
a signatory to 1907 The Hague Convention, the factors listed are
more than evidence of historical state practice; they also provide
a baseline for current United States’ interpretations of
international law.61 Specifically, the 1907 Hague Convention
spells out the “Qualifications of Belligerents” to include not only
regular armies but also informal groups, including organized
armed groups.62 Of the factors listed, none reference oaths of
loyalty or speech as a factor to determine belligerent status.
However, the factors are not exclusive, and state practice may
expand them.
Although the United States’ Department of Defense
(DoD) Law of War Manual (Law of War Manual) does not
represent the official positions of the United States, it does provide
a non-exhaustive list of factors to consider when assessing
membership in an organized armed group. 63 Only one of the
factors listed concerns speech: “[f]ormal membership in an armed
group might be indicated by . . . taking an oath of loyalty to an
OAG [Organized Armed Group] [emphasis added].”64 Thus, the
59

Id.
Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its
Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, July
29, 1899, https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates=XPages_NORMStatesPart
ies&xp_treatySelected=150.
61
Convention Between the United States & Other Powers Respecting the Law &
Customs of War on Land, Feb. 28, 1910, 36 Stat. 2277.
62
Id. at art. 1-2. The list includes, militia, volunteer corps and levee en masse.
63
LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 8, vi.
64
Id. ¶5.7.3.1; see also REPORT ON THE LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS
GUIDING THE UNITED STATE’S USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND RELATED NATIONAL
SECURITY OPERATIONS, THE WHITE HOUSE (2016), https://www.state.gov/wp60
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Manual implies that while speech might indicate membership in
an organized armed group, it is not a stand-alone factor. This
position is supported by DoJ motions written and filed in the
Guantanamo Bay Litigation Cases, which state that:
Evidence relevant to a determination that an
individual joined with or became part of al-Qaida
or Taliban forces might range from . . . an oath of
loyalty, to more functional evidence, such as
training with al-Qaida . . . or taking positions
with enemy forces. In each case, given the nature
of the irregular forces, and the practice of their
participants or members to try to conceal their
affiliations, judgments about the detainability of
a particular individual will necessarily turn on the
totality of the circumstances.65
Although this position considers detainability rather than
targetability, it supports the argument that the totality of the
circumstances, not a single speech act, establishes membership in
an organized armed group. Furthermore, extensive research into
historical practice did not reveal any instances where a member of
an armed group was targeted solely based on an oath of loyalty.66
Although United States’ domestic criminal law is at best
persuasive on United States’ interpretations of IHL, the DoD Law
of War Manual cites to the United States’ Federal Cases and
United States criminal code, and it is of note in this context.67 In
content/uploads/2019/10/Report-to-Congress-on-legal-and-policy-frameworks-guidinguse-of-military-force-.pdf; see also Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed
Groups and the I.C.R.C. "Direct Participation in Hostilities" Interpretive Guidance, 42
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 641, 690–91 (2009); Eran Shamir-Borer, Fight, Forge, and
Fund: Three Select Issues on Targeting of Persons, 51 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 959, 963
(2018).
65
Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority
Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay at 6–7, In Re Guantanamo Bay Detainee
Litigation, 624 F. Supp. 2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Misc. No.08-442), U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions
Lexis 96279 (emphasis added).
66
The court cases cited by the Manual involved situations where members of
organized armed groups had appealed their convictions, and the courts made a ruling on
their status based on factors exhibited. In most instances the individual was targetable
based on their conduct as opposed to status. Examples of classifications found included
“fighter, bomber, bomb maker, planner, propagandist, financer, leader, etc.” LAW OF WAR
MANUAL, supra note 8, ¶¶ 5.7.3.1-5.7.3.2.
67
Id.

JUNE 2021

FIGHTING WORDS

617

addition to these DoJ memos, both the United States Code and the
United States Supreme Court have clarified that mere association
or oaths to organized armed groups, in isolation, do not constitute
unlawful behavior.68 Instead, the Code makes clear that some
further action must accompany the oath before an individual can
be convicted of supporting terrorism.69
While the DoD Law of War Manual lists “taking an oath”
as a factor, based on stated United States intent in interpreting
IHL, historical state practice, contemporary state practice, and
application of United States domestic law, it seems that the United
States does not consider speech alone sufficient to establish
membership in an organized armed group. In other words, simply
verbally pledging allegiance to an organized armed group, without
further conduct, does not appear sufficient to establish the legal
basis for status-based targeting.70 Instead, there must be some
additional conduct, combined with the speech, that makes a
civilian targetable. Examples of typical additional conduct that
occur after swearing an oath could include, but are not limited to:
basic training, receiving uniforms, official training, etc. The fact
that some additional targetable conduct must accompany
declarations of status means that status-based targeting in the
speech-driven context is not a stand-alone category. Even though
status-based targeting is not a stand-alone category, as seen below,
it is possible that speech declaring status could interact with
speech constituting targetable conduct to satisfy the requirement
for status-based targeting in the speech-driven context.
3. The interaction of conduct and status-based
targeting. — Before concluding the discussion on distinction, it is
necessary to consider how conduct and status-based targeting
interact in the speech-driven context. Based on the conclusions
reached in the above sections, status-based targeting cannot be
established simply by verbally declaring membership. Rather, in
68

Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 25–26 (2010).
18 U.S.C.S. § 2339B Notes to Decisions states, “18 USCS § 2339B does not
penalize mere association with foreign terrorist organization; what it prohibits is act of
giving material support. 18 U.S.C.S. § 2339B (Notes to Decision, §2 Constitutionality &
LexisNexis 2021); see also United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127, 149–150, 175 (2d Cir.
2011).
70
Since speech cannot make someone a status based combatant, it stands to reason
that speech alone cannot rescind that status either.
69

618

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 30 NO. 3

order to establish membership, there must be some conduct that
accompanies the verbal declaration. There should be an
understanding that this required additional conduct could be in the
form of speech. As such, it is possible that verbal declaration of
membership when coupled with targetable verbal conduct could
form the legal basis for speech-driven status-based targeting. For
example, someone who met status-based criteria (such as
proclaiming status in an armed group) would not be targetable
until they engaged in conduct-based criteria (such as directing
specific fighters to carry out a specific attack). However, after
both of these criteria were met the person would be targetable as
a member of an organized armed group until they take affirmative
steps to end their membership in the group.71 Based on the state
practice examined in previous sections, it appears that speech can
support status-based targeting, but only after a basis for conductbased targeting has been established.
This interpretation, supported by state practice, takes
aspects from both the ICRC and United States’ position to bridge
the middle ground between them. By requiring conduct-based
speech to serve as the foundation for speech-driven targeting, the
interpretation described above adopts the portion of the ICRC’s
position on DPH, limiting the definition of participation to
“measures preparatory to the execution of a specific act.”72
71
When membership in an organized armed group and the accompanying
targetable status ends is a matter of some debate in the traditional action-driven context.
States and commentators disagree about how long the targetable status endures and what
steps need to be taken to end membership or participation in hostilities. The intricacies of
this debate need not be repeated here, but it is interesting to consider whether a targetable
status based only on speech can be rescinded by speech alone. To answer this question, it
is once again helpful to look to action-driven targeting to make analogous comparisons. In
traditional action-driven targeting the ICRC and the United States specifically state that
one of the factors used to determine whether an individual is still a target includes
renouncement of membership or an informal public declaration that the individual no
longer wishes to participate in hostilities. Therefore, if speech can rescind an action-driven
targetable status, it would stand to reason that genuine renunciations could end a speechdriven targetable status. The qualifier of “genuine” is added to renunciations in order to
prevent individuals from taking part in hostilities, then renouncing membership or
participation in hostilities to regain civilian protections. Therefore, while speech alone can
terminate a speech-driven targeting designation, it must be a genuine statement, and may
need to be accompanied by actions that demonstrate the authenticity. See generally LAW
OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 8; NELS MELZER, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS,
INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009).
72
MELZER, supra note 10, at 65–68.
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Simultaneously, this interpretation embraces the United States’
position on status-based targeting in that there is no “revolving
door” – once someone has participated in hostilities, by action or
by speech, they are targetable until they permanently cease their
participation.73 This middle-ground interpretation in the area of
speech is appropriate due to the nature of speech. As this article
has made clear, freedom of speech rightfully holds a more
protected place in both United States and international policy. Due
to speech’s protected status, States should bear a higher burden
before placing an individual in a more permanent status-based
target category. Speech-driven targeting allows for speech to
serve as a more permanent status-based targeting status, but only
if preceded by speech that justifies conduct-based targeting.
While this distinction between justifications for targeting
may seem trivial, it is a crucial distinction. Under a conduct-based
targeting justification, an individual is only targetable for such
time as they commit targetable conduct. In status-based targeting,
a person is targetable for the duration of the conflict regardless of
their conduct. If in the speech-driven context, conduct-based
targeting can be used to support status-based targeting, an
individual would be targetable for a longer period, thereby
enlarging the window during which States could take action.
The United States’ state practice pertaining to these four
fundamental principles of IHL, make clear that speech can form
the legal basis for the use of force under a jus in bello analysis.
Throughout Part I, there exists a salient counterargument that the
conclusions reached are based too much on inference rather than
explicit state guidance or explanation of practice. Although this
counterargument may weaken the case surrounding the speechdriven targeting analysis, it strengthens this article’s overarching
argument. By acknowledging that insufficient guidance or
explanation of practice exists, this counterargument demonstrates
that more defined standards are necessary in the area of speechdriven targeting.
73
LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 8, ¶ 5.8.4; U.S. Dep’t of Army, Field
Manual 6-27/U.S. Marine Corps, Techniques Publication 11-10C, The Commander's
Handbook on the Law of Land Warfare (Aug. 7, 2019), ¶ 2-18,
https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN19354_FM%20627%20_C1_FINAL_WEB_v2.pdf.
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Part I demonstrated the United States and other States
practice speech-driven targeting; the ICRC, as the primary
independent commentator in IHL, accepts the practice.
Specifically, Part I demonstrated all speech-driven targeting
decisions must center on a discussion of what speech constitutes
an “imminent attack,” which denotes direct participation in
hostilities. However, in establishing the existence of speechdriven targeting, Part I also showed there is genuine disagreement
surrounding the definition of imminence. Although similar
debates regarding imminence exist in the context of action-driven
targeting, the debate is different in speech-driven targeting due to
the vital status of speech as a fundamental human right.74
II. HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY USES OF
SPEECH-DRIVEN TARGETING
Because there is universal agreement that speech is a
protected fundamental human right, there must be similar
agreement on what speech falls outside of this protected rights
status and is therefore targetable. Clear guidelines as to the
boundaries of protected speech in an armed conflict means that
individuals can express themselves without fear of retribution are
based on a nebulous standard. Simultaneously, clear boundaries
allow states to act in self-defense when speech truly constitutes an
imminent attack. In order to construct a meaningful test, Part II
examines three categories of current and historical state practice
pertaining to: (1) individuals who engage in propaganda; (2)
planners and leaders who take part in hostilities by verbally
directing others; and (3) recruiters and trainers who verbally
encourage others to join in hostilities. Assessing how individuals
in these three categories are targeted, and the international
community’s response will achieve two goals. First, this
descriptive approach will clarify where disagreement exists in the
application of speech-driven targeting. Second, this approach will
show where a proposed test would need to focus in order to
resolve this disagreement.
74

Both in the US and international community cite the freedom of speech and
expression as paramount in both the U.S. Constitution and the Universal Declaration of
Human rights. U.S. CONST. amend. I; G.A. Res. 217(III) A, Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948), at 19.
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A. Propagandists
The first recorded historical description of targeting based
on speech alone concerns propagandists and comes from a
controversial and influential medieval Muslim jurist named Ibn
Taymiyya.75 During the 14th century, Ibn Taymiyya wrote on a
number of topics, including under what circumstances protected
classes of persons could be considered appropriate targets.76 In the
14th century, women were considered non-combatants by almost
all standards. Ibn Taymiyya was clear in his writing that, despite
this protected status, women could become legitimate targets if
they engaged in propaganda.77 While international law did not
have the same structure as today, the logic behind Taymiyya’s
conclusion is clear. Targeting propagandists satisfies military
necessity because propagandists provide a clear military
advantage to the enemy, and the distinction is arguably satisfied
because propagandists participate in hostilities by encouraging
others to engage in attacks. Based on this logic, there has been an
argument since the 14th century that propagandists are targetable
based on their speech.
Six centuries later, NATO used similar logic to justify
targeting propagandists during the 1999 Kosovo air campaign. In
justifying strikes against media targets, NATO Air Commodore
David Wilby stated, “Serb radio and TV is an instrument of
propaganda and repression, it has filled the air waves with hate
and with lies over the years and especially now. It is therefore a
legitimate target in this campaign.”78 Providing further legitimacy
to this position, British Prime Minister Tony Blair stated that
“these television stations are part of the apparatus of dictatorship
and power of Milosevic . . . [a]nd we are entirely justified as the
75
IBN TAIMIYYA, ON PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAW IN ISLAM 141 (Omar A. Farrukh
trans., Khayat Book & Publ’g, 1st ed. 1966); Naser Ghobadzdeh & Shahram Akbarzadeh,
Sectarianism and the Prevalence of ‘Othering’ in Islamic Thought, THIRD WORLD
QUARTERLY 694–97 (2015).
76
While Tamiyya did not write in terms that included modern legal language such
as “civilian” or “direct participation in hostilities” he did write on when protected classes
of people could be attacked. The best example of this is his controversial interpretation that
Muslims could declare fatwa against other Muslims. DEVIN SPRINGER ET AL., ISLAMIC
RADICALISM AND GLOBAL JIHAD 29 (Geo. Univ. Press 2009).
77
Id.
78
Press Release, NATO, David Wilby, Air Commodore, and Fabrizio Maltinti,
Commander (Apr. 8, 1999) https://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990408a.htm.
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NATO alliance in damaging and attacking all these targets.”79
Thus, it is clear that the United Kingdom, and likely NATO, take
the position that speech, which is part of the enemy’s state
apparatus, is targetable under a military necessity analysis.
The position outlined above, however, seems to ignore the
distinction analysis and has not gone unchallenged. Indeed, there
is a fine line between a propagandist who uses speech to inspire
support generally and those who use speech to direct specific
attacks. Highlighting this distinction and discrediting the United
Kingdom’s interpretation, the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia’s (ICTY) Final Report on the NATO
bombing campaign, found that:
Disrupting government propaganda may help to
undermine the morale of the population and the
armed forces, but justifying an attack on a civilian
facility on such grounds alone may not meet the
"effective contribution to military action" and
"definite military advantage" criteria required.80
This tension between the NATO and ICTY position is concerning,
as it demonstrates the vast amount of speech-driven targeting
undefined under international law. This lack of clarity can be fatal
for individuals and media outlets that misjudge an enemy’s
interpretation of international law in an armed conflict.
Because NATO gave multiple justifications for targeting
the radio station, some of which were not speech-driven, it is
important to provide one specific instance here to demonstrate that
the United States and NATO still firmly believe that
propagandists are targetable. In September 2016, the United States
targeted and killed Wa'il Adil Hasan Salman al-Fayad, whom the
79
23 April: NATO Defends TV Attack What Was done, What Was Said; All
Friday's Developments at a Glance, GUARDIAN (Apr. 23, 1999, 1:38 PM), https://www.t
heguardian.com/world/1999/apr/23/balkans17.
80
Of note is the fact that NATO later provided further justification for the
bombing of the RTS, by stating that the communication equipment at the station was also
being used to support the command, control, and communications network of the military.
Under international law, civilian objects being used for a military purpose are lawful targets
in an armed conflict. Final Report to the Prosecutor by the committee Established to
Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
ICTY Doc. PR/P.I.S./510-E, 39 I.L.M. 1257, ¶ 1, 76 (June 13, 2000) [hereinafter ICTY
Final Report Yugoslavia].
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Pentagon described as ISIL’s “Minister of Information.”81 This
strike is noteworthy because there is no evidence that Fayad
committed any action-driven attacks that would otherwise make
him targetable.82 Furthermore, Fayad was not part of a larger strike
against senior ISIL members; he was targeted in isolation while
riding a motorcycle.83 While no statement by the United States
mentions speech-driven targeting, the details of this strike make
clear that United States’ practice supports the position that speechdriven targeting of propagandists is lawful.
Despite this position by the United States, it is difficult to
justify how targeting propagandists meets the criteria established
for speech-driven targeting. While NATO and the United States
seem to arrive at the correct conclusion that there is a military
advantage from targeting propagandists, any justification for
targeting propagandists fails the distinction requirement. The
analysis fails the distinction requirement based on both the
ICRC’s position that the act be one casual step away from the
harm, and the United States’ position that the act be the proximate,
or but-for cause, of the harm. Under either interpretation, it is
difficult to argue that the actions of propagandists are sufficiently
connected to hostilities or responsible for harm from attacks to be
considered as participating in hostilities.84 It is important to note
that there is an distinct line between propaganda and directly
inciting violence. If the latter is occurring, then the action is no
longer propaganda and is likely targetable. However, as the ICTY
stated in their Final Report to the NATO bombing in Yugoslavia,
“[i]f the media is used to incite crimes, as in Rwanda, then it is a
legitimate target. If it is merely disseminating propaganda to
generate support for the war effort, it is not a legitimate target.”85
81
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Statement from Pentagon Press Secretary
Peter Cook on Airstrike Against ISIL Senior Leader (Sept. 16, 2015) https://www.defens
e.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/946983/statement-from-pentagon-presssecretary-peter-cook-on-airstrike-against-isil-se/.
82
Id.
83
Barbara Starr & Ryan Browne, US Says it Killed New ISIS Information Minister
in Drone Strike, CNN (Sept. 16, 2016), https://edition.cnn.com/2016/09/16/politics/dronestrike-isis-minister-information/.
84
In assessing whether an action constitutes DPH the DoD Law of War Manual
lists, “degree to which the act is connected to hostilities” and “the degree to which the act
causes harm” and factors that should be considered. LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 8,
¶ 5.8.3.
85
ICTY Final Report Yugoslavia ¶ 47.
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Because propaganda influences and manipulates behavior in a
general way, as opposed to specific actions, it is difficult to justify
how propaganda can meet the requirements for an imminentattack under a speech-driven targeting analysis.
Some would counter this position with the argument that
propagandists are targetable, not because of their specific actions,
but because of their membership in an organized armed group.
This argument fails, however, because of the requirements
established in Part I of this article. Part I specifically established
that membership in an organized armed group could be achieved
by speech only if an individual declared membership and engaged
in speech that constituted an imminent attack. Therefore, despite
long-standing historical practice, a speech-driven targeting
analysis would mean that propagandists are not a lawful target
under current United States’ guidance and practice, because
propaganda cannot be classified as an imminent attack, due to its
lack of specificity.
B. Planners and Leaders
Planners and leaders of militaries and organized armed
groups often do not engage in hostilities personally, but rather
direct others to do so. This tactical direction and conduct-based
behavior is often the foundation of state targeting decisions, and
the correct analysis under the speech-driven standards defined in
Part I of this article. An uncontroversial example of state practice
in this area is the U.S. strike on Osama bin-Laden in 2011. BinLaden was clearly a leader and member of al-Qaeda as well as a
tactical level planner of attacks against the United States.86 It can
be argued that his speech formed the initial conduct that
transformed bin-Laden from a civilian to a lawful target, but once
his speech made him a lawful status-based target, he remained so
until the ultimate strike. Although the United States did not
reference a speech-driven standard in targeting bin-Laden, they
did use the two-step process outlined by Part I. The United States
followed this process by first identifying speech that constituted
an imminent attack under conduct-based targeting, and then used
86
United States of America, The Death of Osama bin Laden, INT’L COMM. OF THE
RED CROSS, https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/united-states-america-death-osama-binladen (last visited Apr. 6, 2021).

JUNE 2021

FIGHTING WORDS

625

that speech to support a more permanent status-based targeting
justification from 2001 until the strike in 2011.87
This analysis that bin-Laden never stopped being a statusbased target is supported by the statements released immediately
following the death of bin-Laden. Five days after the raid that
killed bin-Laden, a Pentagon official told the press corps that binLaden “remained an active leader in al-Qaida, providing strategic,
operational, and tactical instructions to the group . . . He was far
from a figurehead [and] continued to direct even tactical details of
the group’s management and to encourage plotting.”88 This
official statement, and others at the time of bin-Laden’s death,
clearly demonstrate that the United States was not relying solely
on bin-Laden’s verbal declaration of membership in al-Qaeda as
a basis of targeting. The statement also indicates that the United
States relied on the fact that bin-Laden was giving tactical
directions to members of the group to form the basis of the speechdriven targeting. By analyzing the statements following the death
of bin-Laden, it is clear that the United States relied on the speechdriven analysis outlined in Part I to form the basis for targeting.
While other cases like bin-Laden provide clear examples where
the imminence standard is satisfied, a more recent case shows the
tension in the imminent attack standard under speech-driven
targeting.
In January of 2020, the United States carried out a strike
against Qasem Soleimani because he “was actively developing
plans to attack American diplomats and service members in Iraq
and throughout the region.”89 Using this statement as the basis for
the strike, it is clear that the United States’ legal basis centered on
the fact that General Soleimani was, via speech, directing
imminent attacks against the United States. In speaking about the
justification for the strike, at no point did the United States
explicitly state that the strike on Soleimani was based on a speech87
President Barack Obama, Address at the White House: Osama Bin Laden Dead
(May 2, 2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2011/05/02/osama-bin-ladendead.
88
United States of America the Death of Osama bin Laden, INT’L COMM. OF THE
RED CROSS, https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/united-states-america-death-osama-binladen (last visited Apr. 6, 2021).
89
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Statement by the Department of Defense
(Jan. 2, 2020), https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2049534/st
atement-by-the-department-of-defense/.
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driven standard. Despite this, in reviewing the facts and
justifications behind the strike, a convincing case emerges that a
speech-driven analysis provides the best foundation for justifying
the strike. The strike against Soleimani has drawn sharp critique
in the international community for lack of justification under
international law.90 The purpose of this article is not to debate the
different justifications, but rather demonstrate how this strike
could be justified from a speech-driven perspective.
If a speech-driven analysis is applied to Soleimani as a
planner, it is clear that his alleged actions in verbally directing
others to attack the United States could satisfy the requirement
that targetable speech constitutes an imminent attack, exclusive of
their status in a military.91 Much of the critique surrounding the
Soleimani strike, however, centers on the fact that even if he were
planning actions against the United States, the actions were
neither imminent nor rose to the necessary levels to constitute an
attack. These critiques, while perhaps valid, are meaningless
because there is no rule for what constitutes imminence under
speech-driven targeting.
While the exact definition of the imminence standard used
in the speech-driven strike on Soleimani is an unsettled area of the
law, the strike provides a valuable case study on how speechdriven targeting can be used to justify strikes on individuals based
on their conduct, via speech, exclusive of their status in a military.
Nowhere in the statement justifying the strike does the United
States ever claim that Iran was planning to attack. Rather
Soleimani, as an individual, was “developing plans to attack.”92 If
the United States was able to use a speech-driven targeting test
that focused on Soleimani’s verbal actions in planning attacks, the
United States could establish a legal basis for targeting him as an
individual without entangling his actions with the state of Iran, or
his status as an Iranian general. By doing this, the United States
90
Agnes Callamard, The Targeted Killing of General Soleimani: Its Lawfulness
and Why it Matters, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 8, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/67949/th
e-targeted-killing-of-general-soleimani-its-lawfulness-and-why-it-matters/.
91
There has also been critique of the strike claiming that there was insufficient
evidence to show that Soleimani was planning imminent attacks. Again, the purpose of this
Article is not to dispute the facts, but analyze how the facts, as presented by a government,
could justify a strike based on a speech-driven standard.
92
DoD Statement, supra note 89.
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could make an argument that the basis of the strike was not actions
by Iran, but rather speech by Qasem Soleimani. Because
Soleimani’s speech makes him targetable as an individual, this
could have, in theory, precluded retaliatory action by Iran.
If States can target individuals like Soleimani based on
speech and divorce the speech of individuals from the actions of
States, this would have a limiting effect on the retaliatory actions
States can take, thereby limiting conflict and violence. In the case
of Soleimani, the United States was very careful in its language
justifying the strike not to tie Soleimani’s actions to Iran.93 If this
interpretation were the norm in the case of Soleimani, Iran would
have been forced to make a difficult choice. Either take
responsibility for Soleimani’s speech in planning imminent
attacks on the United States and incur liability as a State or refuse
to adopt Soleimani’s speech and allow the United States to take
action against Soleimani as an individual. However, in order to
have these discussions, there must be an agreement as to what
speech constitutes an imminent attack. In analyzing propagandists
and planners as categories of speakers, a lack of consistent
definition as to imminence is inhibiting the development of a rule
in the context of speech-driven targeting.
C. Recruiters and Trainers
The final category of individuals who are regularly
targeted based on speech are those individuals who recruit or train
civilians to take part in hostilities. Recruitment and training are
tasks that have historically been essential to armed conflicts.
However, in the information age, recruiting and training are
dominated by speech as opposed to action. Much of this speech
takes place online through platforms such as YouTube, Twitter,
Tumblr, Telegram, Facebook, or a myriad of other online
platforms.94 Because much of this recruiting and training takes
place online, it is pure speech with no tangible action outside of
93

Id.
An Update on our Efforts to Combat Violent Extremism, TWITTER (Aug. 18,
2016), https://blog.twitter.com/official/en_us/a/2016/an-update-on-our-efforts-to-combatviolent-extremism.html; Dhiraj Murthy, Evaluating Platform Accountability: Terrorist
Content on YouTube, 65 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 800, 800–24 (2021); Rebecca Tan,
Terrorists’ Love for Telegram Explained, VOX (June 30, 2017), https://www.vox.com/wo
rld/2017/6/30/15886506/terrorism-isis-telegram-social-media-russia-pavel-durov-twitter.
94
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the digital world.95 This isolation of speech is invaluable in the
discussion of speech-driven targeting.
One of the most infamous online recruiters was the
American born al-Qaeda recruiter and trainer, Anwar al-Awlaki.
Awlaki’s case is unique for several reasons. For the discussion at
hand, Awlaki is unique because he was exclusively a verbal
participant in hostilities. All official statements and positions by
the United States concerning Awlaki agree that he was a verbal
participant in hostilities who “repeatedly called on individuals to
kill innocent men, women, and children to advance the murderous
agenda.”96 Based on Awlaki’s speech, he was targeted and killed
by a United States drone strike in September 2011.
As established by Part I, even though Awlaki proclaimed
membership in al-Qaeda, this speech alone cannot establish
status-based targeting. Instead, there must first be an
accompanying conduct-based foundation. Legal opinions by the
United States DoJ written to justify the targeting of Awlaki
support this conclusion. In 2010, David Barron, the Acting
Assistant Attorney General, wrote, “the targeted person [Awlaki]
is part of a dangerous enemy force [al-Qaeda] and is engaged in
activities that pose a continued and imminent threat to U.S.
persons or interests.”97 By acknowledging the conjunctive nature
of Awlaki’s activities conducted via speech, United States’
practice, through the DoJ memo, is tacitly endorsing the two-step
process outlined in Part I.
While the Awlaki case again confirms this two-part test
that Part I set forth, it also brings the debate back to the question
of imminence. Awlaki was dangerous because he motivated and
recruited others to join al-Qaeda and eventually carry out
attacks.98 In this role Awlaki acted as (1) a general propagandist
95

Id.
Obama, supra note 1.
97
While the use of both bases could simply be the U.S. government building a
case to the American people and not reflective of the legal or policy requirement to target
Awlaki, it is an official statement that, without contradiction, will translate into state
practice. Memorandum from David J. Barron to the U.S. Att’y Gen., Applicability of
Federal Criminal Law and the Constitution to Contemplated Lethal Operations Against
Anwar al-Aulaqi (July 16, 2010) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Awlaki DoJ Memo].
98
How Dangerous Is Anwar al-Awlaki, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/05/31/how-dangerous-is-anwar-al-awlaki;
See also Glenn Greenwald, Criminalizing Free Speech, SALON (June 1, 2011),
https://www.salon.com/control/2011/06/01/free_speech_4/.
96
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for al-Qaeda by making videos and sermons justifying jihad
against the West in the context of Islam, (2) a recruiter for alQaeda for encouraging faithful Muslims to join in jihad against
America, and (3) as a spiritual trainer helping specific individuals
justify their missions. Was Awlaki’s speech as a recruiter and
trainer sufficient to justify an imminent attack under conductbased standards? While the United States would claim that his
actions were sufficient, many scholars and States would
disagree.99
The dispute about what constitutes direct participation
under the definition of imminence in action-driven targeting is a
constant that many scholars and States have accepted as the
norm.100 However, this is unacceptable in a speech-driven
targeting context. Not only is the freedom of speech a universal
human right in international law, the United States has also
characterized First Amendment principles as a universal human
right.101 Allowing a nebulous standard to exist around speechdriven targeting undermines speech’s importance from both the
international and United States perspective. A more precise rulebased standard is necessary. Creating a rule that defines
imminence and sets forth procedural guidelines will allow
individuals to clearly understand the limits of free speech and
enhance the uniform application of free speech standards under
international law. Part III will develop a model rule for speechdriven targeting to achieve these goals.
III. DEVELOPING THE TEST’S FACTORS
Part II established that speech-driven targeting is
practiced by States and accepted by international law
commentators. Despite this well-accepted practice, the
examination of speech-driven targeting also revealed that States
and scholars do not agree on the limits of speech-driven targeting
99
NELS MELZER, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON
THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 20
(2009).
100
Michael Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct
Participation in Hostilities: A Critical Analysis, 1 HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. 5, 14–15 (2010).
101
Historically the U.S. has characterized the First Amendment as a universal
human right. Timothy Zick, Territoriality and the First Amendment: Free Speech At - And
Beyond - Our Borders, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1543, 1549 (2010); G.A. Res. 217(III) A,
supra note 74, at 19.
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or on a common set of definitional guidelines. In order to remedy
this gap in international law, Part III will normatively define the
factors that should be used in speech-driven targeting. Preeminent
international law scholars, Abram Chayes and Thomas Ehrlich,
have posited that international law can affect international policy
in three ways: (1) as a constraint on policy, (2) as a justification
for policy, and (3) as an organizational structure for policy
decisions.102 Adapting these conclusions to speech-driven
targeting shows that developing clear factors for speech-driven
targeting decisions will provide three core advantages: (1) serving
as a substantive constraint on the ability to use lethal force in
response to speech, (2) justifying the use of force against speech
without violating the rights associated with free speech, and (3)
organizing decision-makers’ actions in a manner that provides
consistent policy decisions when targeting speech. By using clear
factors, speech-driven targeting decisions would no longer consist
of nebulous legal or policy standards, but more precise legal rules,
that allow better decisions by both states and speakers.
In order to develop a more precise rules-based
application, Part III will propose three factors for use in speechdriven targeting decisions. These factors are adapted from United
States First Amendment case law because when speech-driven
strikes are conducted in a manner divorced from First Amendment
standards, there is an argument to be made that the United States
is conducting strikes in an unconstitutional manner. Further,
because the United States has a large body of First Amendment
case law there is a large body of jurisprudence to draw upon for
guidance. Although the focus of this article is on United States
policy and law, because freedom of speech is a universal human
right recognized by the UN, the three proposed factors have been
developed in such a way that they are adaptable to any liberal
interpretation of free speech rights.
A. Possible First Amendment Violations
The focus of this article is not on domestic and foreign
applications of First Amendment case law to United States
citizens and non-citizens. There is a rich debate among scholars

102

Chayes, Supra note 7.
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on this topic that is beyond the scope of this article.103 Despite this,
a brief discussion of how the First Amendment might apply to
targeting decisions outside of the United States is required. This
discussion is necessary to understand why speech-driven targeting
decisions, regardless of location or nationality of the target, should
be moored in First Amendment standards. While the First
Amendment usually applies to actions by the government inside
the United States, an argument exists that the First Amendment
applies extraterritorially if: (1) a United States citizen is
conducting the speech104 or (2) a United States citizen is
consuming the speech105 and (3) the United States government is
acting as a sovereign regulator (e.g., the government is taking
action against the speech).106 If condition (1) or (2) exists, and is
accompanied by condition (3), then the First Amendment
arguably applies, and there should be heightened scrutiny
regarding the targeting.
These restrictions would be substantially diminished if
the targeted speech fell into a category of speech that was
“unprotected” by the First Amendment, such as fighting words,
incitement, true threats, or solicitations to commit crimes. Current
state practice, although vague and ill-defined, best aligns with the
First Amendment body of law defining incitement to commit
imminent lawless action. Understanding how the First
Amendment arguably applies to United States targeting, and how
certain forms of speech are “unprotected,” helps develop targeting
criteria that would be supported by IHL, as well as United States
laws and policy regarding the freedom of speech.
1. Is a United States citizen conducting the
speech? — The protections and ideals enshrined in the First
103
For an excellent discussion on how the First Amendment applies abroad see
Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution After Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S. CAL.
L. REV. 259, 287 (2009) (arguing that First Amendment protections may apply abroad
depending on factors like “where the speech originated, where its intended audience was,
and the location of detention and trial.”). Compare id., with Kermit Roosevelt,
Guantanamo and the Conflict of Laws: Rasul and Beyond, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2017, 2066
(2005) (expressing doubt that communications abroad are protected under traditional First
Amendment justifications).
104
Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 308 (1981); Zick, supra note 101, at 1549; Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5 (1957).
105
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972).
106
Conduct by a government official is, as a general rule, government action if it
is related to the official's governmental duties. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 54 (1988).
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Amendment are at the zenith of their power when the United
States government acts against a United States citizen speaking to
United States citizens inside the United States. As the speaker,
listener, and location of the speech move outside the borders of
the United States, the constitutional protections diminish, but they
never entirely disappear.107 Action against a person conducting
targetable speech inside the United States falls under the
jurisdiction of domestic law, and the analysis would take place
under a law enforcement paradigm and International Human
Rights Law, and is beyond the scope of this article. For this reason,
the analysis of First Amendment protections begins with speechdriven targeting of a United States citizen speaking beyond the
borders of the United States.
If a United States citizen is conducting the speech, then
the First Amendment may apply, regardless of the speaker’s
location.108 The location is arguably irrelevant because the United
States Supreme Court has largely rejected the idea that “when the
United States acts against citizens abroad it can do so free of
the Bill of Rights.”109 Furthermore, the Court has specifically held
that other constitutional rights, including the Fourth, Fifth, and
Sixth Amendments apply to United States citizens, regardless of
location.110 Therefore, when the United States targets a United
States citizen like Awlaki, case law supports the argument that the
First Amendment, and its associated protections, would apply.
Because the First Amendment arguably applies, any speechdriven targeting divorced of a First Amendment analysis could
result in a Constitutional violation of free speech.
107

Haig, 453 U.S. at 308; Zick, supra note 101, at 1549.
Timothy Zick, The First Amendment in Trans-Border Perspective: Toward a
More Cosmopolitan Orientation, 52 B.C. L. REV. 941, 944–46 (2011); compare Gerald L.
Neuman, Extraterritorial Rights and Constitutional Methodology After Rasul v. Bush, 153
U. PA. L. REV. 2073, 2076–77 (2005), with Kermit Roosevelt III, Guantanamo and the
Conflict of Laws: Rasul and Beyond, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2017, 2066 (2005). Some
commentators view the Constitution itself as a social compact with an extensive
extraterritorial reach. They would presumably support a more robust extraterritorial First
Amendment. See Louis Henkin, The Constitution as Compact and as Conscience:
Individual Rights Abroad and at Our Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 11, 34 (1985).
109
Reid, 354 U.S. at 5.
110
DOJ WHITE PAPER ON LAWFULNESS OF LETHAL OPERATION AGAINST U.S.
CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 5 (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1957) (plurality
opinion)); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269–70 (1990); see also, In
re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa, 552 F.3d 157, 170 n.7 (2d Cir.
2008).
108
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2. Is a United States citizen consuming the
speech? — Even if the speaker is not a United States citizen, if a
United States citizen is the consumer of the speech, some First
Amendment constraints could apply. These protections would still
apply because the First Amendment exists not only to protect
speakers, but also to protect the free flow of speech within the
marketplace of ideas.111 First Amendment protections extend to
speech consumption as well as production.112 Because the First
Amendment protects both United States speakers and United
States consumers of speech, if the United States government acts
to limit the speech available to United States citizens via speechdriven targeting, First Amendment principles may apply.113
The Supreme Court has stated that “in a variety of
contexts, this Court has referred to a First Amendment right to
‘receive information and ideas.’”114 Furthermore, the Court has
held that this right is transnational. Specifically, the Court has held
that the First Amendment applies to the rights of United States
citizens to exchange ideas with specific foreign speakers, as well
as receive general information from foreign sources.115 This
concept is of particular importance in the information age where
American citizens can view videos posted on the internet by
someone like bin-Laden, even if the videos are aimed at fighters
in Afghanistan. The question of whether a single viewing by a
United States citizen would be sufficient to trigger First
Amendment standards is beyond the scope of the article.
However, it is worth noting how far First Amendment standards
could potentially extend based on current Supreme Court case
jurisprudence.
3. Is the United States government acting as a sovereign
regulator? — Even though the First Amendment states,
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,
[emphasis added]” the Supreme Court has applied the First
Amendment to Executive Branch actions on numerous
111

Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972).
Id.
113
Zick, supra note 101, at 1549.
114
Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 762.
115
Id. (regarding exchanges with a specific individual); see also Lamont v.
Postmaster Gen. of U.S., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965) (regarding exchanges with foreign
sources of information generally).
112
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occasions.116 Deadly force, applied through speech-driven
targeting is not the typical “governmental action” considered in
most First Amendment cases. Regardless, under a First
Amendment analysis, when the US government uses force against
a speaker , the government is acting as a sovereign regulator,
thereby satisfying the third and final prong to trigger First
Amendment standards.
4. Is the speech protected? — Even though the First
Amendment could apply to a wide range of scenarios, targeting
restrictions imposed by the First Amendment principles would
only apply if the speech were in a protected sub-class. While the
First Amendment protects speech, it also recognizes that not all
speech is equal and grants varying levels of protection to different
forms of speech. In deciding what is considered unprotected
speech, case law has distinguished between speech that presents a
danger in the abstract, as opposed to speech which presents an
imminent danger. 117 As speech becomes more likely to present a
tangible threat of violence, the protections diminish.118 In this
regard, the First Amendment analysis is not dissimilar to the
analysis in Part I, where it was established that only speech
constituting an imminent attack could form the basis of speechdriven targeting. Part I also established, however, that speechdriven targeting lacked any meaningful standard of imminence.
By mooring definitional standards of imminence in accepted First
Amendment case law, vague concepts used in speech-driven
targeting decisions such as “imminent threat” assume a
meaningful definition that can be used in speech-driven targeting
decisions.119
116

Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Obama, 705 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1047
(W.D. Wis. 2010) (citing United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 465
(1995)), rev’d, 641 F.3d 803 (2011); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)
(per curiam); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen. of U.S., 381 U.S. 301, 305, (1965); see
also McCreary County, Ky. v. Am. C.L. Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 877 (2005); Sch.
Dist. of Abington Township, Penn. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
117
While the Supreme Court has held that political and ideological speech can be
regulated by the government, it came to the same conclusions as Part I, noting that US law
does not “penalize mere association, but prohibits the act of giving foreign terrorist groups
material support.” Holder, 561 U.S. at 6.
118
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
119
Note that “imminent threat” was the language the Obama administration used
to justify the targeting of Awlaki. DOJ WHITE PAPER ON LAWFULNESS OF LETHAL
OPERATION AGAINST U.S. CITIZEN, supra note 3.
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While there is an argument to be made that the First
Amendment applies extraterritorially to targeting decisions, no
court decision or United States policy has ever explicitly stated
that this is the case. Thus, it is possible that First Amendment
protections do not apply in some or all of the scenarios discussed
above. However, even if the First Amendment does not apply
directly, there are two compelling reasons why the United States
should still comply with First Amendment principles
extraterritorially. First, “the United States has historically
characterized and sought to position the First Amendment as a
universal human right.”120 Second, the UN Universal Declaration
of Human Rights recognizes the “right to freedom of opinion and
expression.”121 Therefore, mooring speech-driven targeting
principles to the principles of freedom of speech and expression is
appropriate regardless of whether Constitutional protections
strictly apply.
B. Proposed Factors for Speech-Driven Targeting
The First Amendment is a valuable starting point for
establishing what kinds of speech constitute lawful targets under
an imminent threat standard. 122 However, the First Amendment
exists for domestic applications in times of peace and must be
modified slightly for applicability in armed conflicts abroad. The
best First Amendment test to apply in assessing “imminent threat”
is the Brandenburg test for incitement. In Brandenburg v. Ohio,
the United States Supreme Court articulated a three-pronged test
to determine whether speech fell outside of First Amendment
protection.123 To lose protection, the Court held that the speech
must consist of language directed to incite or produce imminent
lawless action and it must be likely to incite such action.124
The three factors used to determine whether the speech is
unprotected are: (1) the likelihood that the lawless action would
occur, (2) whether there was intent to incite lawless action, and
120
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(3) whether the speech called for imminent lawless action.125
These Brandenburg factors are similar to those in IHL guidance
on when a civilian has lost their protected status by directly
participating in hostilities (DPH). In assessing whether a civilian’s
actions constitute DPH, and justify targeting, United States
guidance on IHL uses a non-exhaustive list of factors as guidance.
The following three US factors in particular find parity in the
Brandenburg standard: (1) is the act likely to adversely affect a
party to the conflict, (2) is the act intended to advance the war
aims of a party to the conflict, and (3) is the act the proximate
cause of the attack. This article proposes a modification of the
Brandenburg factors for jus in bello application, as follows: (1)
the likelihood that the speech will cause an attack to occur; (2)
whether there was intent to incite an attack; and (3) whether the
speech called for an imminent attack. These three modified factors
from Brandenburg provide a metric for assessing what speech is
targetable.
1. Is the speech likely to cause an attack? — The first
factor in assessing whether an individual has participated in
hostilities is whether or not their actions meet the “threshold of
harm.” In providing clarity to this factor, the DoD Law of War
Manual states that threshold of harm is determined by, “the degree
to which the act is likely to adversely affect the military operations
or military capacity of a party to an armed conflict.”126 This
requirement finds parity in the Brandenburg likelihood factor,
which measures whether the speech is “likely to incite or produce
lawless action.”127 Both of these tests emphasize how likely the
action or speech is to bring about a violent act. The more likely
the speech is to cause an attack, the more imminent the danger,
and the less protected the speech. In this respect, the Brandenburg
likelihood factors finds parity and provides guidance to the IHL
factors for speech-driven targeting.
In Brandenburg, the words in question were uttered by a
Ku Klux Klan (KKK) leader who encouraged violence against
Black and Jewish people and urged the taking back of states’
rights by force. In protecting the KKK leader’s words, the Court
125
126
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found the likelihood of incitement was low and that, “a mere
abstract teaching . . . for a resort to force and violence, is not the
same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such
action.”128 Although Brandenburg’s words were reprehensible and
inflammatory, the Court found that because they were abstract and
general, they were unlikely to incite or produce lawless action.
Applying this standard to speech-driven targeting would mean
that before speech could be targeted it would have to be likely to
produce an attack.
In the context of an armed conflict, if an extremist leader
were to generally encourage violence against American forces in
Iraq and to take the Iraqi government back by force, the analysis
from Brandenburg is insightful in deciding whether this speech is
targetable. Under a Brandenburg analysis, the language in
question is unlikely to produce an imminent attack because the
speech is abstract and does not prepare a specific person or group
for violent action against a particular target. As a result, the
speaker would maintain their protected civilian status, just as the
Court found the speech to be protected in Brandenburg.
In contrast to the exercise of speech noted above, if
Brandenburg or the extremist leader had gone beyond advocacy
and been more direct, the likelihood of violence would have
increased. As the likelihood of violence increases, so does the
imminence of an attack. In determining the line between protected
and unprotected speech, Brandenburg states that the more specific
the language is in preparing a group for an attack the more
imminent the threat.129 In the above example of the extremist
leader, his speech would fall outside Brandenburg’s standards and
only become targetable if the leader made specific calls for
violence against specific targets. Language that could make the
speech targetable could include directing particular followers to
attack at a certain time, location, or against specific units or
individuals. Thus, Brandenburg is instructive in considering how
likely an attack is and provides granularity in defining likelihood.
Regardless of how likely an attack is to occur based on speech,
there must also be an assessment of whether the speaker intended
to incite an attack. If the speaker was merely careless and did not
128
129
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intend to incite an attack, then it is unlikely that the speaker
possesses the requisite intent to be considered a lawful target.
2. Is
the
speech
intended
to
incite
an
attack? — According to Brandenburg, not only must the speech
be likely to produce lawless action, but the speech must also be
intended to produce lawless action.130 The DoD Law of War
Manual contains a similar requirement, stating there should be an
assessment of the “specific purpose underlying the act, such as,
whether the activity is intended to advance the war aims of one
party [emphasis added].”131 With the DoD Law of War Manual’s
intent requirement in mind, the Brandenburg standard provides
amplifying guidance in line with state practice.
In 1989, the United States Supreme Court provided
clarification to Brandenburg’s intent standard in Texas v.
Johnson.132 In Johnson, a man was convicted of burning the
American flag at a political rally while onlookers chanted,
“America, the red, white, and blue, we spit on you.”133 In
overturning the conviction and clarifying the intent prong of
Brandenburg, the Court held that not only must the speech be
likely to cause violence, but that the speaker must also intend to
cause violence. Specifically, the Court stated,
We have not permitted the government to assume
that every expression of a provocative idea will
incite a riot, but have instead required careful
consideration of the actual circumstances
surrounding such expression, asking whether the
expression is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action . . . . To accept Texas’
arguments that it need only demonstrate “the
potential for a breach of the peace . . . would be
to eviscerate our holding in Brandenburg. This
we decline to do.134
Reading the holding in Johnson in conjunction with jus in bello
standards in order to comply with First Amendment protections, a
130
131
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speech-driven targeting test would require that the speaker
demonstrate an intent to incite an attack.
For example, if during an armed conflict, an Afghan
civilian burned an American flag, this speech would not be
targetable. Even if disparaging language towards United States
troops accompanied the burning of the flag, the speech is protected
by both a First Amendment and jus in bello analysis. Furthermore,
even if the act of burning the flag emboldened others to attack
American troops, the flag burning in isolation demonstrates
insufficient intent to be targetable speech. On the other hand, if
specific calls for violence accompanied the flag burning, the
speech expressed by burning the flag would be targetable.
Johnson, clarifies that not only must an attack be likely, but the
speaker must also intend for an attack to occur.135
The first two factors focus on how likely the speech is to
cause an attack, and whether the speaker intended to cause an
attack. First Amendment case law, however, requires a third factor
be present before speech is considered unprotected. The speech
must be linked to the lawlessness or attack in some way. This final
factor again finds parity in First Amendment case law and IHL.
3. Does the speech call for an imminent attack? — Under
traditional targeting standards, in order to decide what actions
constitute an imminent threat and warrant targeting under DPH
standards, the United States looks at whether an action is the
proximate cause of an attack. In assessing whether an act meets
this standard, the DoD Law of War Manual states that an act must
be “the proximate or ‘but for’ cause of death, injury, or damage to
persons or objects belonging to an opposing party.”136 This
language, requiring a proximate causal link, mirrors the imminent
lawlessness factor from the Brandenburg test.137
The Court clarified the imminence prong of the
Brandenburg test in the 1973 case Hess v. Indiana. In Hess, after
the police forcibly removed the defendant and other protestors
from the street, Hess yelled, “we'll take the [expletive] street
later.”138 In protecting the speech, the Court held that “there was
135
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no evidence that [Hess’ words were] . . . likely to produce
imminent disorder.”139 Because Hess’ speech was not directed at
a specific person or group of persons and only advocated illegal
action at some indefinite time, the speech remained within First
Amendment protections.140
Similarly, in 2015, members of the Islamic State Hacking
Division posted a list of Americans working in the military and
government, stating that the information was provided “to the
soldiers of the khilafah [caliphate], who soon with the permission
of Allah will strike at your necks in your own lands!”141 Although
the group called for action by soldiers of the caliphate, they were
not speaking to an actual group of individuals, but rather a
notional group of radicalized individuals in the West.
Furthermore, the call for action was not accompanied by specifics.
Much like Hess’ use of the words “take the street later,”
the verbiage, “soon will strike,” is a “the mere abstract teaching
[and] is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and
steeling it to such action.”142 While this speech is close to being
targetable, because it is not directed towards a specific action or a
specific group, it is too many casual steps removed to be deemed
the proximate cause of an attack. A would-be attacker would have
to find the list online, locate individuals on the list, plan an attack,
then commit an attack. Thus, there are too many intervening steps
to make the posting of the list the proximate cause or “but for”
cause of the attack. Therefore, the speech would not represent an
imminent attack and would not be targetable.
However, if the group had communicated the list of
names to specific individuals and provided instructions for people
on the list to be attacked, the hackers would have demonstrated a
clear intent to incite an imminent attack. By calling on specific
individuals the hacker’s speech would be “preparing a group for
violent action and steeling it to such action,”143 and the hackers
would become lawful targets. However, without this specificity in
139
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the hacker’s language, United States guidance on IHL, coupled
with amplification from Brandenburg and Hess, demonstrates that
this kind of speech would not be targetable.
4. Utilization of the factors beyond United States
standards. — In developing the factors above, alternative
interpretations from commentators such as the ICRC were
considered, but United States interpretation of IHL were used
exclusively for the analysis. This exclusive use of United States
standards, however, should not be interpreted to mean that
standards proposed by this article would only apply to United
States interpretations of IHL. Although every State has unique
interpretations of IHL, there is consensus that IHL principles
apply in an armed conflict, specifically the Geneva Conventions
and the sections of the Additional Protocols that are considered
customary international law.144 Therefore, the differences are not
in the foundational standards of IHL, but rather differences in
interpreting those foundational standards. Because the differences
are based in interpretation, as opposed to standards, this means
that the guidelines developed above could apply to a wide variety
of interpretations of IHL.
To demonstrate how these factors could apply to various
interpretations of IHL, it is useful to apply the ICRC's factors for
DPH to the factors developed above. In determining whether an
individual's actions constituted DPH, the ICRC uses three factors:
(1) the likelihood that the act will adversely affect the enemy's
military capacity, (2) whether there is a direct causal link between
the action and the harm, and (3) whether the act is specifically
intended to cause the required threshold of harm.145 Despite the
slight differences between the ICRC and United States factors, it
is apparent that the ICRC factors also find parity in the speechdriven standards developed above. This shared parity means that
the ICRC’s targeting factors could be translated into the same
three factors developed for United States targeting.
While these three factors developed for the ICRC would
be identical in language to those developed for the United States,
144
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the ICRC could interpret the factors differently to provide the
higher level of protection desired by ICRC standards. In
particular, the second factor requiring the speech to call for an
"imminent attack" could be narrowly interpreted to meet the ICRC
standard of direct causation. To satisfy this narrow interpretation,
the ICRC, and States more aligned with the ICRC's interpretation,
could require speech to directly cause an attack before it could be
targeted. For example, under an ICRC interpretation, an
individual would have to directly order someone to attack before
the imminence standard would be satisfied. In this manner, the
factors developed by this article could be applied to a wide variety
of interpretations of IHL, while still providing enhanced guidance
to speech-driven targeting.
As with any normative approach that attempts to
transform a nebulous standard into a robust factor-based rule,
there is the critique that it unnecessarily constrains States’ ability
to use force in a timely manner and, degrades the jus ad bellum
inherent right to self-defense. While a valid critique, this is a trade
that liberal societies like the United States must accept and have
accepted in the past in the area of free speech. The duty of the law
is “to patrol the fine line between vital national security concerns
and forbidden encroachments on constitutionally protected
freedom of speech.”146 Without clear rules-based parameters, the
law cannot patrol this line. While there are drawbacks to a more
rigid rules-based standard, the benefits of protecting speech and
providing clear guidelines will lead to more coherent and uniform
decisions when States choose to target speech.
IV. APPLYING THE ENHANCED FACTORS
Part IV applies the factors outlined in Part II to the realworld case of Anwar al-Awlaki, an American Muslim cleric and
a self-proclaimed leader in al-Qaeda on the Arab Peninsula
(AQAP).147 Awlaki’s case is important for several reasons. First,
because Awlaki was a United States citizen, there was a
heightened sense of scrutiny surrounding his strike, producing a
146
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plethora of declassified documents to analyze. Second, there is no
evidence that Awlaki participated in hostilities via traditional
action-based means; all of his participation was via speech.
Finally, Awlaki was a prolific speaker who engaged in a wide
range of rhetoric, which allows for an analysis of his role as a
propagandist, leader, and recruiter and trainer.148 This Part
concludes that had the United States utilized the enhanced factors
from Part III, the United States justification for the strike and
international reaction would have been on ostensibly solid legal
and policy grounds thereby engendering a more positive
international reaction. Specifically, the use of the factors from Part
III would have allowed the United States to justify targeting
specific portions of Awlaki’s speech based on the category the
speech fell into. This approach would have allowed the United
States to articulate a more coherent rationale for targeting
Awlaki’s speech. A more articulate and coherent rationale would
have in turn, structured the international response and led to
international discussion and acknowledgment of standards for
targeting speech under international law.
A. Nature of Awlaki’s Speech
As noted, Awlaki was a prolific speaker. In order to
systemically examine his various types of speech, the analysis will
be limited to his speech conducted inside of Yemen from 20042011. During this period, Awlaki’s speech can be placed into one
of four categories. The first is declaratory speech, which he used
to profess membership and secure a leadership role in AQAP.149
The second is propaganda speech with which Awlaki generally
preached inflammatory rhetoric aimed at the West.150 The third is
Awlaki’s speech as a recruiter encouraging others to join
AQAP.151 Finally, Awlaki also used speech to plan attacks against
the United States.152 While President Obama cited all of the above
reasons as the basis for the United States targeting Awlaki, he did
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not distinguish between them.153 For the purposes of the analysis
each type of speech will be treated as a discrete category. In doing
so, it becomes apparent that only Awlaki’s speech in planning
attacks could serve as a lawful basis for targeting.
B. Awlaki’s Declaratory Speech Proclaiming Status in AQAP
On many occasions, Awlaki declared that he was a
member and leader in AQAP. Because the United States is in a
non-international armed conflict with al-Qaeda, Awlaki could be
targeted as a member of an organized armed group under statusbased targeting. Part I, however, elucidated that status-based
targeting cannot exist without a conduct-based foundation.
Therefore, before Awlaki’s declaratory speech can form the basis
for speech-driven targeting there must be a finding that some of
his speech constituted an imminent attack. The United States
found that Awlaki’s speech as a planner and organizer constituted
an imminent attack.
C. Awlaki’s Speech as a Propagandist
During the nine years Awlaki spent in Yemen he
produced countless sermons and lectures in written, audio, and
video formats that were published via the internet. In these videos,
Awlaki encouraged Muslims to attack the West and provided
religious justifications for carrying out the attacks.154 His speech
in this regard was nothing short of prolific. The Counter
Extremism Project counted 99 “extremists” who had been
influenced by Awlaki.155 Among these extremists are notorious
individuals who either committed attacks or took substantial steps
in preparation to do so. Notable individuals include the 7/7
London bombers, the Toronto 18, the Fort Dix shooter, the 2009
Little Rock recruiting office shooter, and the 2010 Times Square
bomber.156 While these individuals cited Awlaki’s propaganda as
153
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an inspiration, none of them had individual contact with Awlaki
either in person or via the internet.157
In deciding whether propagandist speech can form the
basis for speech-driven targeting, the normative factors developed
in Part III are instructive. In addressing the first factor of
likeliness, there is a high likelihood that this kind of propaganda
would result in attacks. Both the content of the speech, and the
fact that numerous extremists cited Awlaki as a source of
inspiration, serve to provide sufficient evidence to meet the first
factor.
Moving to the second factor of intent, it is also clear that
Awlaki explicitly intended his propaganda to result in attacks.
Awlaki used language such as “[d]on't consult with anybody in
killing the Americans, fighting the devil doesn't require
consultation or prayers seeking divine guidance. They are the
party of the devils.”158 The intent of the propaganda is selfevident, satisfying the second factor of the test.
In examining the causation factor, however, it is clear that
Awlaki’s propaganda was not the proximate cause of the attacks.
In conducting this general propaganda, Awlaki did not
specifically target the individuals who carried out the attacks. Nor
did Awlaki’s propaganda provide these individuals with specific
targets. Much like the language used in Hess (“we'll take the
[expletive] street later”), Awlaki’s speech was inflammatory but
insufficiently specific to constitute an imminent attack. There are
too many intervening factors between Awlaki’s propaganda and
Islamic-preacher-also-inspired-July-7-bombers.html). In 2006, the Toronto 18 accessed
Awlaki’s radical lectures via the internet. Michelle Shephard, The Powerful Online Voice
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the attacks for the propaganda to be considered the proximate
cause of the attacks. Due to these intervening factors, Awlaki’s
propaganda cannot serve as the basis for his targeting and
justification must be found elsewhere.
D. Awlaki’s Speech as a Recruiter
Awlaki also spoke individually to those he was trying to
recruit or individuals who reached out to him. The most notorious
of these individuals was the Fort Hood shooter, Nidal Hasan. In
the year leading up to the shooting Hasan and Awlaki exchanged
as many as 18e-mails between December 2008 and June 2009.159
Again, it is important to understand that these exchanges were not
specific directions or coordination, but rather general recruitment.
Prior to the attack Hasan praised Awlaki’s message and sought
advice about topics such when jihad is warranted and when it is
permissible to kill innocents in suicide attacks.160 In an interview
to the Washington Post after the attack, Awlaki described himself
as Hassan’s “confidant.”161
The first two factors as to whether Awlaki’s speech as a
recruiter is targetable are met, as Awlaki’s speech was likely to
result in attack and was intended to result in attacks. This means
that, the determinative factor is again whether Awlaki’s speech
was the proximate “but for” cause of the attack. Setting aside the
fact that Hasan initiated the contact, thus demonstrating a
predisposition to carry out an attack, there still appears to be
insufficient justification to support the assertion that Awlaki’s
speech was the “but for” cause of the attack.
This conclusion is supported by government findings both
before and after the attack. The F.B.I was aware of and had access
to Awlaki’s correspondence with Hasan before the attack, and in
reviewing the language of the e-mails before the attack the F.B.I
found that they “did not suggest any threat of violence and
conclude[ed] that no further action was warranted.”162 Even after
159
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the attack, with knowledge of the e-mails and the actual attack, the
F.B.I. stated that “there is no information to indicate Major Nidal
Malik Hasan had any co-conspirators or was part of a broader
terrorist plot.”163 The conclusions of the F.B.I. in reviewing
Awlaki’s speech are in line with the amplifying guidelines from
Hess on proximate cause and imminence. Even though Awlaki
personally addressed Hasan, Awlaki never suggested a time, date,
location, or method of attack. While Awlaki recruited Hasan in
general terms, Awlaki did not use speech to direct the attack, and
the lack of specific direction from Awlaki to Hassan prevents
Awlaki’s speech from being described as the proximate cause of
the attack.164 Therefore, Awlaki’s speech as a recruiter cannot
form the foundation for speech-driven targeting.
E. Awlaki’s Speech as a Planner and Organizer
Finally, Awlaki’s speech in his role as a planner and
organizer within AQAP must be considered. Speaking
immediately after the strike that killed Awlaki, President Obama
cited two specific attacks that Awlaki planned and organized: a
2010 transatlantic cargo bomb plot and a 2009 bomb plot to blow
up a United States passenger plane.165 Little is known about
Awlaki’s exact role in the 2010 plot, but in the 2009 plot, the
bomber, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, was captured and
interrogated by the F.B.I.166 During this interrogation,
Abdulmutallab outlined specific conversations he had with
Awlaki providing a tremendous level of detail about Awlaki’s
involvement and in particular, the speech Awlaki utilized in
organizing the attack.167 While large parts of the transcript remain
classified, the publicly available portions provide a sufficient
basis to justify the speech-driven targeting of Awlaki.
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In describing Awlaki’s role in the bombing,
Abdulmutallab made clear that someone other than Awlaki
developed and presented the plan to him.168 Furthermore, someone
other than Awlaki trained Abdulmutallab for the mission.169 While
the planning and training that were conducted via speech would
likely also be targetable, this section focuses on Awlaki’s speech.
Regarding Awlaki’s specific role in the attack, Abdulmutallab
stated that Awlaki “gave [him] final specific instructions: that the
operation should be conducted on a U.S. airliner.”170 It is this
interaction, conducted exclusively through speech, that makes
Awlaki a lawful target.
As before, the first two factors under the enhanced test are
met in that Awlaki’s speech was both intended to result in an
attack and, based on the training provided to Abdulmutallab, was
likely to result in an attack. It is the level of specific direction that
Awlaki provided, regarding the target of the attacks, that satisfy
the definition of imminent and proximate “but for” cause under
enhanced test standard. Because Awlaki’s words were directed at
a particular individual and were specific, his speech must be seen
as an imminent attack or the “but for” cause of the attack that
Abdulmutallab intended to carry out. Thus, Awlaki’s speech as a
planner and organizer meets all three prongs of the enhanced test,
and his speech satisfies the basis for speech-driven targeting.
F. Awlaki as a Status-Based Target
At the beginning of the analysis on Awlaki, there was a
determination that although he declared himself a leader and
member of AQAP, this declaration was of no legal consequence
without a foundational conduct-based determination. Because
Awlaki’s speech in planning and organizing Abdulmutallab’s
attack satisfies the factors of the enhanced test for lawful conductbased targeting, his speech can support a status-based
determination. Even though Awlaki began asserting his
membership and leadership role in AQAP as early as 2007, it was
not until he verbally participated in hostilities in late 2009 that he
168
Interview by F.B.I. with Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab at University of
Michigan Hospital, Ann Arbor, Mich., 3 (Dec. 25, 2009). (names of the planners and
trainers are redacted and remain classified).
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Id.
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Interview by F.B.I. with Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, supra note 167, at 24.
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became targetable for the duration of hostilities under a statusbased justification.171 United States’ legal opinions produced in
mid-2010 support this conclusion that Awlaki was not targetable
until he verbally participated in hostilities.172
Awlaki was monitored by the United States since
September 2001, and his name was associated with several
terrorist plots in the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada
in 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2009.173 In all of these attacks, however,
Awlaki’s influence was no more than the general propaganda and
recruiting as seen in the cases previously mentioned. While none
of the United States government memos or white papers produced
to support the targeting of Awlaki mention speech-driven
targeting or any of the enhanced factors outlined in this article, the
timing of their publication indirectly supports the conclusions
developed above.174 The first memo to support the targeting of
Awlaki came five months after Abdulmutallab detailed the
specific directions Awlaki gave in the failed 2009 attack.175
Although Awlaki had generally inspired and recruited individuals
to commit attacks before this, his language was never sufficiently
specific or directed enough to be considered an imminent attack.
Only after Awlaki’s speech in Abdulmutallab’s case came to light
did the United States consider his actions targetable, thereby
indirectly supporting the factors used and conclusions reached
above.176
G. Altering the Debate
The justifications for the strike against Awlaki were
widely discussed in the media, among international law scholars,
and within the United States government. Despite this widespread
171
Scott Shane, The Anwar al-Awlaki File: From American Citizen to Imam to
Terrorist to Drone Killing, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 529,
NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE (Sept. 15, 2015), https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/N
SAEBB529-Anwar-al-Awlaki-File/.
172
Awlaki DoJ Memo, supra note 97, at 38.
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See Sherwell, supra note 156; Shephard, supra note 156; Killing of Awlaki is
Latest in Campaign Against Qaeda Leaders, supra note 156; Goetz, supra note 156.
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The Awlaki DoJ memo was written on July 16, 2010, and the DOJ WHITE
PAPER ON LAWFULNESS OF LETHAL OPERATION AGAINST U.S. CITIZEN was written on
November 8, 2011. Awlaki DoJ Memo, supra note 97; DOJ WHITE PAPER ON LAWFULNESS
OF LETHAL OPERATION AGAINST U.S. CITIZEN, supra note 3.
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discussion, much of the debate centered on Awlaki’s actions, and
status as a leader within AQAP, as opposed to his speech.
However, as this article has shown, standard action-driven models
are inadequate when considering speech-driven targeting. In
particular, the debate surrounding Awlaki’s targeting was lacking
in two respects. First, because an action-driven model was used to
target Awlaki, the imminence standard was incorrectly applied,
thereby leading the United States to include his role as a
propagandist and recruiter in their targeting analysis, which is
incorrect. As seen throughout this article, neither propagandists
nor recruiter’s speech rises to the level of an imminent attack
necessary to justify an attack. Second, even if the imminence
standard was correctly applied, there remains a strong secondary
argument that the basis and justifications for speech-driven
targeting are inherently different than those in play in action
centric-targeting.
Speech, as one of the fundamental human rights and most
vigilantly guarded of United States freedoms, deserves a higher
and more defined standard for imminence. If the United States had
applied the enhanced factors outlined by this article in targeting
Awlaki, the international community would have had a valuable
starting point for discussing how to target speech in an armed
conflict. More importantly, the United States, and other States,
would have had a basis to object when other States exceeded the
boundaries of targetable speech. By defining and defending this
line, the United States could continue to protect what is one of the
most fundamental rights in a free global society.
CONCLUSION
This article explored state practices and guidance from
international law commentators to conduct a descriptive analysis
of speech-driven targeting. In doing so, an argument developed
that speech-driven targeting, as currently defined and practiced,
lacks sufficient definitional guidance to be considered an
international norm. To remedy this lack of guidance, this article
laid out a normative approach to speech-driven targeting. This
proposed normative approach used the First Amendment to
demonstrate how speech centric targeting can be morally and
lawfully justified.
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An enhanced test is desperately needed at this point in the
law of armed conflict. State and non-state actors are using new
communication mediums and modalities via the internet to use
speech as a weapon against people and governments. International
law must set clear guidelines for when States can lawfully take
retaliatory action against this kind of speech. If international law
fails to establish these guidelines, the use of force against
controversial speech will become the norm on the international
stage. The use of the internet also means that an ever-increasing
amount of speech is monitored and collected by governments. As
governments collect, store, and archive massive amounts of
speech, difficult questions arise. Questions such as whether only
the original speaker is targetable, or whether those who forward
and repost speech may be targeted, and for how long is speech
targetable?
These questions are worth exploring, but they cannot be
answered with any lucidity until basic definitional standards are
established for speech-driven targeting. Finally, this article has
focused on speech in the jus in bello context exclusively. A
separate conversation must take place regarding what kinds of
speech constitute an attack in the jus ad bellum context. This
article represents only an initial effort to outline the discussion
surrounding speech-driven targeting. When speech promotes
violence tension forms between liberty and security. Only by
creating clear definitions as to where the freedom of speech ends
and the right to security begins, will States protect themselves and
the freedoms they embody.

